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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the Utah Court of Appeals err in dismissing 
Reagan Outdoor Advertising's (hereinafter "Reagan") petition 
for a review of an administrative ruling when a notice of 
appeal was timely filed with the administrative agency, 
although not timely filed with the Court of Appeals? 
2. Did the Utah Court of Appeals err in holding that 
the Utah Department of Transportation (the administrative 
agency), while conducting a "formal adjudicative 
proceeding", is not the equivalent of a "court?" 
OPINION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
The Court of Appeals dismissed Reagan's petition for 
review as untimely filec^. The full opinion of this order 
is at page A-l of the Appendix. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals entered its decision in this 
matter on October 16, 1989. Section 78-2-2 (5) of the Utah 
Code (1989) confers jurisdiction on this Court to review the 
Court of Appeal's decision by a writ of certiorari. 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES and REGULATIONS 
Pertinent provisions in this case come from the Utah 
Code and the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. They are 
1 
to be found at Section 63-46b-16 (2) (a) of the Utah Code 
(1988) and Rules 4 (a) and 14 (a) of the Rules of the Utah 
Court of Appeals; the full texts of which are included in 
the appendix. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION 
By a notice dated January 11, 1989, the Utah Department 
of Transportation, District One (hereinafter "UDOT"), 
advised Reagan that an outdoor advertising structure it 
maintains at approximately 287 South Main in Layton, Utah, 
and is also adjacent to the west side of 1-15, near milepost 
3 32.87, was in violation of the Utah Outdoor Advertising 
Act, specifically, section 27-12-136.5 of the Utah Code 
(1989), in that the structure was less than 500 feet 
distance from a previously existing outdoor advertising 
sign. Reagan disputed this allegation and requested a 
hearing as directed by the UDOT notice. 
A hearing was held on May 8, 1989, before Mr. Clinton 
D. Topham, the District One director. The director ruled 
in favor of UDOT, determining that pursuant to measurements 
taken along the highway right of way line as directed by 
paragraph 1 of section VII of UDOT regulations the Reagan 
sign was less than 500 feet from a previously existing 
2 
sign. A written order incorporating the director's findings 
was entered on June 19, 1989. 
Reagan requested reconsideration of the director's 
finding and submitted that it had evidence, pursuant to a 
site survey, that the sign was more than 500 feet distance 
as measured along the highway right of way line. This 
request was summarily denied by Mr. Topham on July 13, 1989. 
Reagan thereafter filed a Notice of Appeal of the UDOT 
ruling with the District One director, Mr. Topham, on August 
14, 1989. The Petition for Review to the Utah Court of 
Appeals was filed August 27th (or 28th), 1989, after the 
Notice of Appeal was returned by UDOT to Reagan. On October 
16, 1989, pursuant to a UDOT motion to dismiss, the appeal 
was dismissed by the Utah Court of Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
1. Reagan's appeal of the administrative ruling was 
originally filed, admittedly with the UDOT agency, on August 
14, 1989; which was a timely filing under section 63-46b-14 
(3) (a) of the Utah Code (1988) and Rule 6 (a) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. At this time an appeal bond in 
the amount of $300.00 was also filed and the court fee for 
an appeal tendered. 
2. Reagan filed its Petition for a judicial review of 
the agency proceeding with the Utah Court of Appeals on 
August 28, 1989, according to section 63-46b-16 of the Utah 
3 
Code (1988). This was, admittedly, more than thirty days 
from the agency order denying Reagan's request for 
reconsideration. 
ARGUMENT 
This case has been handled pursuant to the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act, Section 63-46b et seq. of the 
Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended), which first became 
effective on January 1, 1988. It was originally heard 
before the Utah Department of Transportation ("UDOT"), 
District One, sitting in Ogden, Utah, Clinton D. Topham, 
P.E., District One Director, presiding, and allegedly 
conducted pursuant to the procedures for "formal" 
adjudicative proceedings. Sections 63-46b-6 through 10 of 
the Utah Code (1987-88). 
Certainly, UDOT, District One, under these 
circumstances, sat as a Court, both by definition and by 
statute. Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed. 318 (1979), ("An 
organized body with defined powers, meeting at certain times 
and places for the hearing and decision of causes and other 
matters brought before it . . . " ) ; Section 63-46b-l (1) 
(a), supra, ("[A]11 state agency actions that determine the 
legal rights, duties, privileges, immunities, or other legal 
interests of one or more identifiable persons . . .") It 
should be viewed, and treated, as such. 
The original Notice of Appeal filed with Department 
One of UDOT was also served upon the Respondent, the Utah 
4 
Department of Transportation, and follows virtually the same 
format and contains the same information as the Petition for 
Review filed in this Court. In reality these two documents 
represent the same thing, by whatever title they are called. 
The purpose of Rules 4 and 14 of the Rules of the Utah Court 
of Appeals are fulfilled by either document. 
The original "Notice of Appeal" was filed August 14, 
1989. This was a Monday. It was accepted for filing, at 
that time, by UDOT. Whether under Rule 4 or 14 of the Rules 
of the Utah Court of Appeals the "Notice of Appeal" (or 
"Petition for Review") was to be filed within 3 0 days. 
Thirty days from July 13th, the date of the "Court's" order, 
was August 12th, but this was a Saturday. Under Rule 6 (a) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Saturdays, Sundays and 
legal holidays shall not be computed in the last day of the 
pertinent time period. Filing on Monday, the 14th, was 
therefore timely. 
The only real issue for review under the instant motion 
is whether or not the filing of the "Notice of Appeal" 
(which was included for information purposes in the filing 
to the Court of Appeals with the "Petition for Review") at 
the District One UDOT offices, rather than immediately with 
the Utah Court of Appeals, sufficiently complies with the 
purpose and intent of the statutes to invest this Court with 
jurisdiction in this matter. The purpose of a "Notice of 
Appeal" or "Petition for Review" is the same; to give notice 
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of an intent to appeal. Wood v. Turner, 18 Utah 2d 229, 419 
P.2d 634 (1966). See also. Associates Financial Services 
v. Sew, 776 P.2d 650, 111 Utah Adv. Rep. 63 (CA 1989) and 
Black1 s, supra, at 958. Reagan has complied with these 
express purposes. 
In the Wood case, supra, the Utah Supreme Court held: 
Our Constitution assures the right of 
appeal in all cases to the end that claims 
errors or abuses may be reviewed by another 
tribunal. It is usually held that statutes 
implementing the right of appeal are liberally 
construed and applied in the furtherance of 
justice; and that an interpretation which will 
prevent that right from being exercised is not 
favored. The purpose of a notice of appeal is 
to advise the opposite party that the appeal 
has been taken and of the essential requisites 
thereto. If it does so in substance, it 
should be given effect and mere technical de-
fects should not defeat the right of appeal. (Erryhasis 
added.) 
Id. 
In the recent case of Associates Financicil Services v. 
Sevy, supra, this Court held that, n[T]he purpose of the 
notice of appeal is fundamentally to give notice that an 
appeal has been taken . . ."] (Finding that no party was 
misinformed by the error.) 
Furthermore, Reagan, in the instant case, has 
substantially complied with the statute. "Substantial 
compliance" means that the spirit of the procedural or 
jurisdictional requirements have been satisfied in that the 
intent for which the statute was adopted have been carried 
6 
out in light of the facts of each particular case. 
Patterson v. Dept. of Labor, 678 P.2d 1262 (Wa. 1984). See 
also, Gutierrez v. City of Albuquerque, 631 P.2d 304, 96 
N.M. 398 (1981), ("Substantial compliance has occurred when 
the statute has been sufficiently followed so as to carry 
out the intent for which it was adopted and serve the 
purpose of the statute.11) 
Illustrative of this is Las Vegas Plywood and Lumber, 
Inc. , v. D & D Enterprises, 649 P.2d 1367, 98 Nev. 378 
(1982) . In this case the appellant did not strictly comply 
with Nevada's mechanics lien statute in that it failed to 
post a copy of the notice of lien on the property subject 
to the lien. However, the appellant did mail a copy of the 
notice to the respondent. This did not fully comply with 
the statutory requirements. The Nevada Supreme Court ruled 
that appellant had substantially complied because the 
respondent received actual notice pursuant to the mailing. 
In reaching its decision the Nevada court stated: 
The spirit and purpose of the [mechanic's 
lien statute] is to do substantial justice to 
all parties who may be affected by its provisions; 
and that courts should avoid "unfriendly strict-
ness and mere technicality. This rule should 
always be followed where the objections urged 
serve only to perplex and embarrass a remedy in-
tended to be simple and summary. . . 
Id. at 1371. See alsof People v. Greathouse, 742 P.2d 334 
(Colo. 1987). (Notice of appeal was filed within the 
prescribed time frame but in the wrong court and was 
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therefore alleged to be untimely. The Colorado Supreme 
Court allowed the appeal because either court bestowed 
jurisdiction.) 
Two cases were cited by UDOT in its motion before the 
Court of Appeals to dismiss Reagan's Petition for Review. 
Neither of the cases cited have direct application to the 
instant matter. Prowswood, Inc. v. Mountain Fuel Supply 
Co. , 676 P.2d 952 (Utah 1984), dealt with the issue of a 
failure to remit the requisite filing fee for an appeal at 
the time the notice of appeal was filed. In the instant 
case the filing fees were tendered at the sarnie time as the 
Notices were filed. 
In Holbrook v. Hodson, 24 Utah 2d 120, 466 P.2d 843 
(1970), the Supreme Court ruled that a district court could 
not subsequently confer jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court 
once the Supreme Court had once dismissed an appeal. 
(Plaintiffs filed motion to dismiss appeal; defendants did 
not respond and appeal was dismissed. Later, defendants 
attempted to procure relief from late filing on motion for 
new trial in district court.) 
CONCLUSION 
This case is believed to be the first appeal taken from 
a ruling of the Department of Transportation under the 
relatively new Administrative Procedures Act. The 
Respondent, the Utah Department of Transportation, was 
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timely notified that Reagan was appealing the decision of 
UDOT, Department One. (After all, they are the same entity 
anyway.) 
Although Rule 14 of the Rules of this Court provides 
for direct filing of appeals to it and not to the agency 
most appeals are filed directly with the court from which 
the appeal is being taken. Rule 4 (a) of the Rules of the 
Utah Court of Appeals. UDOT, District One, in this case was 
most certainly acting in the capacity of a court of law. 
The agency, UDOT, accepted the filing. (They were 
apparently not then aware of the provisions of Rule 14, 
either, being new to having to deal with appeals.) Had they 
not accepted the filing and advised Reagan of this Reagan 
would have taken the notice to the Court of Appeals. Reagan 
immediately filed in the Court of Appeals once the mistake 
was discovered. 
Despite this oversight adequate notice to the other 
party, the Respondent, has been given. The purpose of the 
notice provisions have been complied with; and, under the 
circumstances, Rule 14 of the Rules of the Utah Court of 
Appeals has been substantially complied with, Reagan should 
be allowed to proceed with its appeal, and this Court should 
deny Respondent's Motion to Dismiss. 
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is-*k RESPECTFULLY submitted this / o '**• day of November, 
1989. 
•<=^af 
Douglas T. Hall 
Attorney for Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed four (4) copies of the 
foregoing Petition to Ralph L Finlayson, attorney for 
Respondent, at 23 6 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84114, first class postage prepaid this / S~& day of 
October, 1989. 
U-J-^zyOf 
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APPENDIX 
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C/^Mi« 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
"• •-'-'.:*/.: ?A *r.% Court 
Reagan Outdoor Advertising, 
Inc., and Douglas Madsen, 
Petitioners, 
Utah Department of 
Transportation, 
Respondent. 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Case No. 890511-CA 
Before Judges Orme, Garff and Davidson (On Law and Motion). 
Upon respondent's motion to dismiss the petition for review 
as untimely filed, it appearing that the petition was not 
properly filed under R. Utah Ct. App. 14(a) until July 28, 
1989, and that the filing of a notice of appeal with the 
administrative agency is without efficacy under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-46b-16(2)(a) (1989), said motion is hereby granted. 
The Department of Transportation is not the equivalent of a 
•• court" within the meaning of R. Utah Ct. App. 4(a) and the 
A.L.J, does not conduct a Hearing as a "court of law." See R. 
Utah Ct. App. 18. Appeal from a formal administrative 
adjudication is by original petition to the appellate court 
under R. Utah Ct. App. 14. The filing of a petition for review 
commences the judicial proceeding. In the absence of 
petitioner's timely compliance with Rule 18, this court lacks 
jurisdiction to review the administrative decision. See also 
R. Utah Ct. App. 4C (limiting the transfer of misfiled appeals 
and petitions to the supreme court and the court of appeals.) 
The above 
Department of 
-entitled appeal from an adjudication of the 
Transportation is dismissed as untimely filed. 
DATED this 
FOR THE COURT 
tober, 1989. 
Gregory K 
A-l 
63-46b-16. Judicial review — Fonnal adjudicative pro-
ceedings. 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudica-
tive proceedings. 
(2) fa) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of 
agency action with the appropriate appellate court in the form required 
by the appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court. 
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern 
all additional filings and proceedings in the appellate court. 
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial 
review of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, except that: 
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, sum-
marize, or organize the record; 
»'b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and 
copies for the record: 
(i> against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to 
shorten, summarize, or organize the record; or 
«ii) according to anv other Drovision of law 
A_? 
Rule 4. Appeal as of right: When taken. 
fa) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal 
is permitted as a matter of right from the district court, juvenile court, or 
circuit court to the Court of Appeals, the notice of appeal reauired bv Rule 3 
shall be filed with the clerk of the court from winch the appeal is taken within 
30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from 
Rule 14 r.UlXS 0? THE tTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
TITLE III. REVIEW AND ENFORCEMENT 
OF ORDERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE 
AGENCIES, COMMISSIONS, AND 
COMMITTEES. 
Rule 14. Review of administrative orders: How obtained; 
intervention. 
fa) Time for filing petition for review of administrative order- When 
judicial review by this court of an order or decision of an administrative 
agency is provided by starute, a petition for review shall be filed with the 
clerk of the Court of Appeals within the time prescribed by stamte or, if there 
is no time prescribed, wiihin 30 days after the date of the order or decision. 
The term "agencv"' includes commission, board, committee, or officer. 
A-3 
P I L E D 
DOUGLAS T. HALL 
Utah Bar No. 1305 
1775 North, 900 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-1775 
Attorney for Petitioner 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
Complaintant and 
Respondent, 
vs. 
REAGAN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, 
INC., Petitioner, and DOUGLAS 
MADSEN, 
Respondents. 
COMES NOW the Petitioner, R.O.A. General, Inc., dba 
Reagan Outdoor Advertising, through counsel, and pursuant to 
Rule 14 of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, and hereby 
Petitions the Utah Court of Appeals for a review of the Order 
of the Utah Department of Transportation, District One, 
revoking Appellant's sign permit and ordering the removal of 
Appellant's sign, dated June 19th, 1989, the Order denying 
Petitioner's objection to the form of the Order, dated June 
AUG 271989 
.Vifify T. Necran 
Clark of tim Court 
Utah Court of Apps«ls 
PETITION FOR REVIEW 
Docket No. f f l n S I I - f f r 
A-4 
19, 1989, and the Order denying Appellant's Request for 
Reconsideration, dated July 13, 1989. 
DATED this jZffi^ day of August, 1989. 
Douglas' T. Hall 
Attorney for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Notice of Appeal to be mailed to Ralph L. 
Finlayson, Assistant Attorney General and attorney for the 
Complaintant/Respondent, at 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84114, and to Douglas Madsen, the other, original named 
Respondent, at 1670 Church Street, Layton, Utah 84041, first 
class postage prepaid, this day of August, 1989. 
A-5 
DOUGLAS T. HALL 
Utah Bat No. 1305 
1775 North, 900 West 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111 
Te lephone: (801) 521-1775 
A t t o r n e y for Appe l lant 
BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, DISTRICT ONE 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
Complaintant, 
vs. 
REAGAN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, 
INC., and DOUGLAS MADSEN, 
Respondents. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
COMES NOW the respondent , Reagan Outdoor A d v e r t i s i n g , 
through c o u n s e l , and pursuant to the Rules of the Utah Court of 
A p p e a l s , and hereby g i v e s n o t i c e of i t s appeal to the Utah 
Court of Appeals from the Orders of the Utah Department of 
T r a n s p o r t a t i o n , D i s t r i c t One, revoking A p p e l l a n t ' s s ign permi t , 
o r d e r i n g the removal of A p p e l l a n t ' s s i g n , and denying 
A p p e l l a n t ' s Request for R e c o n s i d e r a t i o n , dated J u l y 13, 1989 . 
DATED t h i s / ^ ^ d a y of August, 1989. 
Douglas^T. Hall 
Attorney for Respondent 
A - 6 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Notice of Appeal to be mailed to Ralph L. 
Finlayson, attorney for the Complaintant, at 236 State Capitol, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, first class postage prepaid, this 
August, 1989. 
/7, 
fy rn 
A- 7 
DOUGLAS T. HALL 
Utah Bar No. 1305 
1775 North, 900 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-1775 
Attorney for Appellant 
BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, DISTRICT ONE 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
Complaintant, 
vs. 
REAGAN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, 
INC., and DOUGLAS MADSEN, ] 
Respondents. 
NOTICE OF FILING 
1 APPEAL BOND 
COMES NOW the re^jSondent, Reagan Outdoor Advertising, 
through counsel, and pursuant to Rule 6 of the Rules of the 
Utah Court of Appeals, and hereby gives notice of filing a cost 
bond on appeal in the amount of $300.QQ with the above-entitled 
agency. 
DATED this day of August, 1989. 
Douglas T. Hall ^ 
Attorney for Respondent 
A-8 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Notice of Filing Appeal Bond to be mailed to 
Ralph L. Finlayson, attorney for the Complaintant, at 236 State 
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, first class postage 
prepaid, this 1H&**t of August, 1989. 
A-9 
634 u t a h 4 1 9 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
IS Utah 2d 229 
Virgil L. WOOD, Plaintiff, 
v. 
John W. TURNER, Warden, Utah 
State Prison, Defendant. 
No. 10471. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Aug. 10, 196G. 
Proceeding on motion to dismiss plain-
tiffs appeal from a denial of petition for 
writ of habeas corpus by the Third District 
Court, Sale Lake County, A. H. Ellett, J. 
The Supreme Court, Crockett, J., held that 
the premature filing of a notice of appeal 
from denial of petition for writ of habeas 
corpus, made within one month after trial 
court had stated that petition was denied 
but before the signing and filing of a for-
mal judgment, was not a defect which 
would ipso facto deprive appellate court of 
jurisdiction, but an irregularity which could 
be ground for dismissal of appeal within 
discretion of court; however, since written 
judgment as filed was in accord with ruling 
appealed from the ends of justice would be 
best served by hearing case on its merits. 
Motion to dismiss appeal denied. 
1. Appeal and Error C=4I I, 422 
Purpose of notice of appeal is to advise 
opposite party that the appeal has been 
taken and of the essentials requisite there-
to, and notice which does so in substance 
should be given effect so that mere tech-
nical defects will not defeat right of appeal. 
Rules of Civil Procedure, rules 61, 73(a); 
Const, art. 8, § 9. 
2. Habeas Corpus C==>113(6) 
The premature filing of a notice of ap-
peal from denial of petition for writ of ha-
beas corpus, made within one month after 
trial court had stated that petition was de-
nied but before the signing and filing of a 
formal judgment, was not a defect which 
would ipso facto deprive appellate court of 
jurisdiction, but an irregularity which could 
be ground for dismissal of appeal within 
discretion of court; however, since written 
judgment as filed was in accord with ruKngf 
appealed from the ends of justice would be 
best served by hearing case on its merits. 
Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 61, 73(a)-
U.CA.1953, 68-3-2, 77-40-3, 77-42-ll> 
Const, art. 8, § 9 . 
3. Appeal and Error <§=>337(2) 
The remedy of dismissal of appeal be-
cause of premature filing thereof would be 
well advised in cases whore judgment had 
not become definite or had not become 
final, or where remedies before trial court 
had not been exhausted. Rules of Civil 
Procedure, rules 61, 73(a) ; Const, art. 8 
§ 9 . 
Jimi Mitsunaga, John D. O'Connell, Salt 
Lake City, for appellant. 
Phil L. Hansen, Atty. Gen., Ronald N. 
Boyce, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for 
respondent. 
CROCKETT, Justice. 
Defendant, Warden of the Utah State 
Prison, moved to dismiss plaintiffs appeal 
from a denial of a petition for writ of habe-
as corpus. 
The plaintiff, Virgil L. Wood, having 
been found guilty of the crimes of robbery 
and grand larceny by a jury on April 30, 
1963, was sentenced to indeterminate terms 
in the Utah State Prison as provided by law 
for those crimes ; sentences to run consecu-
tive to one the plaintiff was then serving. 
A motion for a new trial was made and de-
nied. On September 9, 1965 plaintiff filed 
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the 
District Court of the Third Judicial District 
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. The 
matter was heard on September 30, 1965, at 
the conclusion- of which the court stated 
that the petition was denied. This is indi-
cated in the record. Within the- one month 
allowed for appeal under Rule 73(a), U.R. 
C.P., to wit, on October 1, 1965 the plaintiff 
duly served and filed a notice of appeal. 
Four days thereafter, on October 5, 196:\ 
there was signed and filed a formal judg-
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ment denying the petition. Defendant con-
tends that the plaintiffs notice of appeal 
having thus been filed prematurely, this 
court is without jurisdiction to entertain the 
appeal. 
It is true that this court has previously 
held that the filing of a notice of appeal 
after the expiration of the one month al-
lowed by the rule is a jurisdictional defect.1 
Our conclusion in this case represents no 
departure from that holding. But counsel 
has not cited, nor has our research dis-
covered any case which has ruled that the 
premature filing of a notice of appeal de-
prives this court of jurisdiction. 
[1] Our Constitution assures the right 
•of appeal in all cases to the end that claimed 
errors or abuses may be reviewed by an-
other tribunal.2 It is usually held that stat-
utes implementing the right of appeal are 
liberally construed and applied in the fur-
therance of justice; and that an interpreta-
tion which will prevent that right from 
being exercised is not favored.3 The pur-
pose of a notice of appeal is to advise the 
opposite party that the appeal has been 
taken and of the essentials requisite thereto. 
If it does so in substance, it should be given 
effect and mere technical defects should not 
defeat the right of appeal.4 This is in ac-
cord with the generally desirable objective 
of not placing undue stress on technicalities 
where others are not adversely affected. 
Rule 61, U.R.C.P. provides that, " * * * 
no error or defect in * * * anything 
done or omitted by the court or by any of 
the parties, is ground for * * * dis-
turbing a,judgment or order, unless refusal 
to take such action appears to the court in-
consistent with substantial justice."5 
'• See Anderson v. Anderson, 3 Utah 2d 
277,282 P.2d S45 (1955). 
2
- Constitution of Utah, Article VIII, § 9. 
3. Sutherland Statutory Construction, 3d 
Ed. § GS07. 
4
- See Nunley v. Stan Katz Ileal Estate, 
**;., 15 Utah 2d 120, 338 P.2d 79S 
(1064); Price v. Western Loan and Sav-
ing Company, 35 Utah 379, 100 P. 077 
(1909). 
[2,3] The premature filing of the no-
tice of appeal such as was done in this case 
should not be regarded as a defect which 
will ipso facto entirely deprive the appellate 
court of jurisdiction. It is an irregularity 
which would be grounds for dismissal of the 
appeal within the discretion of the court. 
Such remedy would undoubtedly be well ad-
vised in the cases where the judgment had 
not become definite, or had not become 
final, or where remedies before the trial 
court had not been exhausted. No such cir-
cumstance exists here. The final written 
judgment which was filed is exactly in ac-
cord with the ruling appealed from. We 
cannot see that the defendant was put to 
any disadvantage or that his rights were 
adversely affected by the irregularity of 
procedure here. It is our opinion that the 
ends of justice will best be served by hear-
ing the case on its merits. 
The motion to dismiss the appeal is 
denied. 
MCDONOUGH and CALLISTER, JJ., 
CGfleur. 
WADE, J., heard the arguments but died 
before the opinion was filed. 
HENRIOD, Chief Justice (commenting). 
The main opinion in this case, presumably 
presented and designed for publication in 
the national reports system, is premature. 
The matter is before us on motion to dis-
miss the appeal,—not on a regular appeal, 
under the Rules, from a final judgment. It 
would be a dangerous precedent if we pre-
sumed to pen a definitive and conclusive 
decision on any or all motions to dismiss an 
appeal. 
5. Sees. 77-40-3 and 77-42-1, U.C.A.1953, 
require that all errors which do not affect 
the substantial rights of the parties must 
be disregarded; and § 68-3-2 provides: 
"The statutes * * * of this state 
* * * and all proceedings under them 
are to be liberally construed with a view 
to effect the objects of the statute and 
to promote justice. * * * " 
A - l l 
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The danger of the main opinion, if pub-
lished as our official decision, laying down 
a rule of law under the facts of this case, is 
that it would reverse many decisions of this 
court to the effect that there can be no ap-
peal except from a final judgment of the 
lower court.1 At the time of filling notice 
of appeal in this case, clearly, obviously and 
chronologically there was no final judgment 
in the record, as the main opinion concedes* 
The reasoning seems to be that, "Well, no 
one was hurt, so let's ignore the rules and 
our cases." 
The same reasoning could have been en-
tertained in the cases cited in footnote one 
hereof, but wasn't. The same reasoning 
could have been indulged in Anderson v. 
Anderson,2 where notice of appeal was filed 
only one day late,—even though no party 
to the appeal felt it was injured by the de-
lay, but where this court, without anyone 
asking it to say so, said whether anyone was 
injured or not, the matter was jurisdic-
tional, and that this court had no jurisdic-
tion to hear the matter. 
The cases in footnote one, and the Ander-
son case, with respect to fundamental prin-
ciples, are identical to this case so far as 
jurisdictional concepts are concerned. If 
the main opinion is documented and pub-
lished as the most recent pronouncement of 
the law in this state, in my opinion the rules 
with respect to 1) appeals from final judg-
ments, and 2) the time within which to file 
J. See cases in Note 27, to Rule 72(a), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Vol. 9, p. 
782, Utah Code Annotated 1953; Everett 
v. Jones, 32 Utah 489, 91 P. 360 (1907); 
Candland v. Mellen, 46 Utah 519, 151 P. 
them, are impotent, flatulent and no longer 
controlling. 
I have difficulty in agreeing wholeheart-
edly with the main opinion's statement that 
the "notice of appeal is to advise the oppo-
site party that the appeal has been taken and 
of the essentials requisite thereto,"—if that 
means that this is the only reason for such 
notice. This is a disarming statement, 
which, if true, would have required that the 
cases in footnote one herein should have 
been decided contrariwise, and that Ander-
son v. Anderson, supra, was erroneously de-
cided In my opinion, the main opinion's 
quoted statement is only adjunct, not con-
trolling, as to the main purpose of the notice 
of appeal,—to preserve a right and to pre-
serve the jurisdictional status of the courts, 
—not simply to apprise adversary parties of 
the fact that an appeal has been taken. 
Most times people know this by newspaper, 
radio, television, and often by word of 
mouth or by inquiry of counsel for him who 
might be a respondent. 
I strongly urge that the main opinion not 
be published, since 1) it is a result arising 
not out of a regular appeal where the whole 
record would be before us, but only on a 
motion to dismiss, and 2) it will upset all 
the cases we have decided with respect to 
appeals from final judgments, and 3) would 
reverse Anderson v. Anderson. 
I vote to grant the motion to dismiss, on 
statutory and precedential grounds. 
341 (1915); Haslam v. Paulsen, 15 Utah 
-2d 185, 3S9 P.2d 736 (1964). 
2. 3 Utah 2d 277, 282 P.2d 845 (1955). 
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1 Dean E. Conder, Senior District Judge, sitting by 
special appointment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§78-3-24(1)0) (1987). 
2. Resource Management Co, v, Weston Ranch and 
Livestock Co., 706 P.2d 1028, 1047 (Utah 1985) 
(citation omitted) see, Garff Realty Co. v. Better 
Buildings, Inc., 120 Utah 344, 234 P.2d 842, 844 
(1951). 
3. The requirement that the event occur after for-
mation of the contract distinguishes a case of supe-
rvening impossibility, such as this, from a case in 
which the contract cannot be performed because of 
a mistake, an unknown legal requirement, or other 
fact in existence at the time the contract is made. See 
Quagliana v. Exquisite Home Builders, Inc., 538 
P.2d 301, 305-08 (Utah 1975); Sine v. Rudy, 27 
Utah 2d 67, 493 P.2d 299 (1972); Mooney v. GR 
and Assoc, 146 P.2d 1174,1176(Utah App. 1987). 
4. See Holmgren v. Utah-Idaho Sugar Co., 582 
P.2d 856, 861 (Utah 1978) ("[A] party may be reli-
eved of performing an obligation under a contract 
where supervening events, unforeseeable at the time 
the contract is made, render performance of the 
contract impossible"; the defense did not prevail 
because evidence was insufficient); Transatlantic 
Fin. Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312, 315 
(D.C. Cir. 1966); Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
section 261; J. Calimari & J. Perillo, Contracts, 476 
et seq. (2d ed. 1977); Utah Code Ann. §70A-2-
615(a) (1980) establishes the impossibility defense in 
contracts for the sale of goods. 
5. We recognize that the City's failure to approve 
seems, from our present perspective, to be rather 
easy to foresee. However, the critical fact is not 
whether the event could have been foreseen, but 
rather, whether the parties actually did foresee it 
and provide accordingly in their contract. A dictum 
in one Utah case on impossibility employs the word 
"unforeseeable" in describing the event causing 
impossibility, Holmgren v. Utah-Idaho Sugar Co., 
582 P.2d at 61 (Utah 1978); however, the better and 
more widely accepted rule looks not to whether the 
parties could or should have foreseen the event, but 
rather whether, as a fact of assent, they did foresee 
it. Restatement (Second) of Contracts §261 & 
comment b (1981). 
6. The trial court made no finding expressly deter-
mining when performance became impossible; 
however, since the parties do not contest the matter 
of timing, we presume the trial court's decision to 
be correct in this regard. We therefore do not con-
sider whether the award of rent for the period pre- i 
ceding abandonment was erroneous, because the 
cross-appeal of that award is based solely on the | 
argument that Nichols erred in executing the lease, 
an argument which we rejected above. 
7. See, Castagno v. Church, 552 P.2d 1282 (Utah 
1976); Restatement (Second) of Contracts §265 
(1981); J. Calimari & J. Perillo, Contracts, 495-96 
(2d ed. 1977). 
8. We distinguish Jespersen v. Deseret News Publi-
shing Co., 119 Utah 235, 225 P.2d 1050 (1951) and 
General Ins. Co. of America v. Christiansen Furni-
ture Co., 119 Utah 470, 229 P.2d 298 (1951) because 
they are based on an argument not raised below or 
in this court. At common law, the application of the 
usual contract defenses to a covenant to pay rent 
was limited. We do not reach the question whether 
this rule could apply in this case, because it has not 
been argued. 
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OPINION 
CONDER, Judge: 
The Defendants Harold and Winona Sevy 
appeal from a judgment of the district court 
permitting Associates Financial Services 
Company of Utah ("Associates") to foreclose 
their interest in certain irrigation company 
stock. We affirm. 
In 1981, the Sevys sold about thirteen acres 
of land in Garfield County to Kyle and Cindy 
Stewart, along with 39 shares of the Long 
Canal Company, which for many years had 
furnished irrigation water to the land.2 To 
secure payment of the purchase price, the 
Sevys were beneficiaries of a trust deed cove-
ring both the land and the irrigation company 
stock. The trust deed was duly recorded. The 
Long Canal Company issued a stock certifi-
cate for the 39 shares in the names of the 
Stewarts, and this stock certificate remained in 
the Stewarts' possession. 
In 1985, the Stewarts obtained a loan from 
the Lockhart Company, pledging the canal 
company stock as collateral. The Lockhart 
Company took possession of the stock certif-
icate and filed a financing statement covering 
the stock. A year later, the Stewarts refina-
nced their loan and borrowed from Lockhart 
additional funds secured by the same collat-
eral, bringing the total principal debt to 
$12,213 at 16.5% interest. Lockhart thereafter 
assigned the loan and security interest, and 
transferred possession of the stock certificate, 
to Associates. 
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 
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Stewarts filed a petition in bankruptcy, and 
the trustee abandoned the irrigation company 
stock. Associates thereupon sued to establish 
the priority of its security interest in the stock. 
The trial court concluded that the stock was 
appurtenant to the land and that the Sevys* 
security interest would thus have priority 
superior to that of Associates, but that the 
Sevys were estopped from asserting the prio-
rity of their security interest because they 
permitted the Stewarts to retain possession of 
the stock certificate. Judgment was accordi-
ngly entered on November 4, 19873 permitting 
Associates to foreclose the Sevys' security 
interest. 
The Sevys filed notice of appeal designating 
the Court of Appeals as the appellate court. 
The Iron County Clerk treated the appeal as 
to the Supreme Court, and further filings and 
motions prior to briefing were made in the 
Supreme Court. The case was eventually tra-
nsferred by the Supreme Court to this Court. 
Associates asserts a lack of appellate juris-
diction based on the fact that the notice of 
appeal indicates that the appeal is taken to the 
Court of Appeals. Appellate jurisdiction in 
this type of case is properly in the Supreme 
Court,4 and therefore, the Sevys' notice of 
appeal was incorrect in stating that the appeal 
was taken to the Court of Appeals. However, 
the rules of both Courts recognize that such 
an error is inconsequential.5 Moreover, the 
error caused no real harm in this case, because 
all filings and proceedings on appeal were 
before the Supreme Court until the case was 
transferred here, despite the error on the 
notice of appeal. Since the purpose of the 
notice of appeal is fundamentally to give 
notice that an appeal has been taken,6 and 
since no party or court seems to have been 
misinformed by the error, we find that the 
notice of appeal is sufficient to establish 
appellate jurisdiction, despite the error in 
specifying the appropriate appellate court. 
We turn to the question of the relative pri-
orities of the parties' security interests7 in the 
irrigation company stock, a question of first 
impression. The trial court based its decision 
that the Sevys had superior priority on a line 
of cases interpreting Utah Code Ann. §73-1-
10 (1980), which states that water rights 
"represented by shares of stock in a corpora-
tion .... shall not be deemed to be appurtenant 
to the land ...." Those words have been held 
to create a mere presumption that irrigation 
company stock is not transferred with a con-
veyance of the land to which the stock has 
provided water, and the presumption is rebu-
ttable by clear and convincing evidence.8 All 
of these cases involved a conveyance of full 
title rather than creation or priority of a sec-
urity interest, the issue being whether the irr- , 
igation stock was included in a conveyance of 
the land on which the water was used. 
Applying the case law just described to 
;1 Services v. Sevy CODE«CO 
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establish superior priority in the Sevys would 
be at variance with the priority structure pre-
scribed by Article 9 of the Utah Uniform 
Commercial Code. Priority under Utah Code 
Ann. §70A-9-312(5) (1980) is determined 
generally according to the date on which the 
security interest is perfected. For an 
"instrument" such as a certificated security, 
perfection is accomplished by possession of 
the certificate evidencing the security, except 
for a 21-day period of automatic perfection 
immediately after attachment of the security 
interest.9 The Sevys did not take possession of 
the irrigation company stock certificate, and 
thus did not perfect their security interest in 
the irrigation company stock. Therefore, 
under Article 9, their priority is inferior to 
that of Associates, whose predecessor took 
possession of the certificate and transferred 
possession of it to Associates. 
For Article 9 to apply, the irrigation 
company stock must fall within the definition 
of an "instrument/ which is defined in Utah 
Code Ann. §70A-9-105(l)(i) as including a 
"security." "Security" is in turn defined in 
§70A-8-102(l)(a), which provides: 
(a) A "security" is an instrument 
which (i) is issued in bearer or reg-
istered form; and (ii) is of a type 
commonly dealt in upon securities 
exchanges or markets or commonly 
recognized in any area in which it is 
issued or dealt in as a medium for 
investment; and (iii) is either one of 
a class or a series or by its terms is 
divisible into a class or series of 
instruments; and (iv) evidences a 
share, participation or other interest 
in property or in an enterprise or 
evidences an obligation of the 
issuer. 
The stock here in question appears to be 
issued in registered form as some of a series or 
classes of corporate stock, and the stock cer-
tificate evidences a share in the irrigation 
enterprise of the Long Canal Company. The 
Sevys assert, however, that the stock is not "of 
a type commonly dealt in jpon securities 
exchanges or markets or commonly recognized 
in [Utah] as a medium for irvestment." We 
are nevertheless of the opinion that irrigation 
company stock is a "medium of investment." 
It may be true that there is no established 
stock exchange or institutionalized market for 
trading in irrigation company stock in Utah. 
However, the stock of an irrigation company 
ordinarily embodies its capital, provides a 
return to its owners in the form of water use, 
and was the means by which it amassed the 
resources to obtain its water rights and build 
its water transport and distribution system. It 
is accordingly a medium of investment. 
In holding that Article 9 establishes the 
superior priority of Associates' security inte-
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rest, we distinguish the line of cases holding 
that stock in an irrigation company may be 
appurtenant to, and impliedly conveyed with, 
an interest in real property. The rule of those 
cases does not apply to the creation and per-
fection of security interests in irrigation 
company stock. This conclusion is grounded in 
the rule that a later statute supersedes an 
earlier statute if the two are in conflict,10 
inasmuch as the Uniform Commercial Code, 
enacted in 1965 in Utah, followed in time 
section 73-1-10 of Utah Code Ann., which 
was last amended in 1959. Moreover, in view 
of the importance of uniformity and predict-
ability in commercial law," we favor a result 
which will not have the effect of creating an 
exception to the Article 9 priority structure for 
something which has the appearance of fitting 
rather clearly within that structure. We also 
note, as the trial court did, that it is equitable, 
as between Sevys and Associates, that the loss 
resulting from the double collateralization fall 
upon the Sevys, who, albeit unwittingly, left 
the Stewarts in the position to again borrow 
on the stock. 
We therefore hold that the security interest 
of Associates in the irrigation company stock 
is prior to the unperfected security interest of 
the Sevys, and that Associates may foreclose 
the Sevys' security interest in accordance with 
Article 9 of the Utah Uniform Commercial 
Code. The order of the district court is ther-
efore affirmed.12 
Dean E. Conder, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Regnal W. Garff, Judge 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
1. Dean E. Conder, Senior District Judge, sitting by 
special appointment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§78-3-24(1)0) (1987). 
2. Irrigation companies are a common legal means 
of owning and distributing irrigation water in Utah. 
Many of them began as cooperative enterprises by 
early settlers and eventually took corporate form, 
usually on a not-for-profit basis. The ownership 
of stock in such a company typically gives the sto-
ckholder the right to receive a pan of the 
company's water proportionate to the 'amount 
owned. The ownership of stock in the irrigation 
company thus becomes in some respects tantamount 
to ownership of the water rights themselves. 
3. Associates argues that the notice of appeal is 
untimely, based on the fact that the date stamped 
on the judgment as the date of entry was altered. 
There is no claim, however, of unauthorized tamp-
ering with the court records, or even of error in 
showing the date of entry as November 4, 1987. We 
therefore conclude that the notice of appeal was 
timely filed. 
4. Compare Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2 with Utah 
Code Ann. §78-2a-3 (1988). 
5. R. Utah Sup. Ct. 4C; R. Utah Ct. App. 4C. 
6. Wood v. Turner, 18 Utah 2d 229, 419 P.2d 634, 
635 (1966); Nunley v. Stan Katz Real Estate, Inc., 
15 Utah 2d 126, 388 P.2d 798 (1964). 
7. The trust deed of which the Sevys were named 
beneficiaries suffices as a security agreement and 
both parties appear to have satisfied the prerequis-
ites of Utah Code Ann. §70A-9-203 (1980) for 
creation and attachment of their security interests in 
the stock. 
S. Roundy v. Coombs, 668 P.2d 550 (Utah 1983); Ab-
Jbott v. Christensen, 660 P.2d 254 (Utah 1983); Hatch 
v. Adams, 7 Utah 2d 73, 318 P.2d 633, afFd 
on reh., 8 Utah 2d 82, 329 P.2d 285 (1958) (decided 
on rehearing on the basis of the parol evidence rule) 
Brimm v. Cache Valley Banking Co., 2 Utah 2d 93, 
269 P.2d 859 (1954). 
9. Utah Code Ann. §70A-9-304(l), (4) (1980); see aiso 
R. Henson, Handbook on Secured Transa-
ctions 108-110(1973). 
10. Pride Club v. Miller, 572 P.2d 385, 387 (Utah 
1977); see aiso Ellis v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 
757 P.2d 882, 884-85 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
11. See, Utah Code Ann. §70A-1-102(1) (1980) 
and §70A-l-102(2)(c); Butts v. Glendale 
Plywood Co. 710 F.2d 504, 506 (9th Cir. 1983). 
12. Because we hold that Associates' security inte-
rest is prior to that of the Sevys, we do not reach 
the question of estoppel on which the district court 
based its decision, or the question whether the 
material facts concerning estoppel were in dispute so 
as to preclude summary judgment. 
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OPINION 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
Petitioner Douglas Olsen appeals from the 
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